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Abstract: Suppression activities on large wildfires are complicated. Existing suppression literature
does not take into account this complexity which leaves existing suppression models and measures of
resource productivity incomplete. A qualitative descriptive analysis was performed on the suppression
activities described in operational documents of 10 large wildfires in Victoria, Australia. A five-stage
classification system summarises suppression in the everyday terms of wildfire management.
Suppression can be heterogeneous across different sectors with different stages occurring across
sectors on the same day. The stages and the underlying 20 suppression tasks identified provide a
fundamental description of how suppression resources are being used on large wildfires. We estimate
that at least 57% of resource use on our sample of 10 large wildfires falls outside of current suppression
modelling and productivity research.
Keywords: wildfire; suppression; fire management; resource use
1. Introduction
Hundreds of thousands of wildfires occur annually across all populated continents [1]. One or two
percent of these become large wildfires [2–4] and cause the majority of the damages [2,5,6]. The impacts
of these wildfires will continue to escalate as the wildland–urban interface expands [7,8]. Suppression
continues to be the primary method of wildfire management [9], and it is an increasingly costly
enterprise [10]. Suppression costs increased from $1.3 billion to $3.1 billion inflation-adjusted dollars
in the USA from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s [11]. In Australia, the annual wildfire operations
expenses for the New South Wales (NSW) Rural Fire Service ($217 million in 2016 and $268 million
in 2017) [12] exceeded the combined suppression costs for NSW and Victoria during the 2003 fire
season ($208 million), one of the most severe seasons on record [13]. The suppression of large wildfires
accounts for the vast majority of suppression costs [2,14]. Despite these cost increases, we have a
limited understanding of suppression efforts and their effectiveness on large wildfires [15,16].
The focus of the majority of suppression research is small fires or initial attack success [17,18].
The conceptual model of this body of small fire research is exemplified in suppression simulation
models (SSMs) where all suppression effort is directed at the additive production of control lines until
containment is achieved [19]. Recent large fire suppression research challenges the assumptions of
these models. Anomalous negative production rates (negative correlation between hand-crews and
control line production) indicate that they are not exclusively engaged in fireline construction, the main
assumed activity in SSMs [20]. In addition, despite guidelines prioritising initial attack, nearly half (45%)
of large air-tanker use in the USA is on large fire suppression in conditions that are often outside of the
operational guidelines for effectiveness (e.g., dispatched during peak burning period) and influenced
by proximity to the urban interface, which indicates that objectives beyond containment, such as point
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protection, may be a factor [21] that may not relate directly to containment [21]. Few, if any of the
existing research-based fire-management tools, such as decision support systems (DSS), suppression
simulation models (SSM) or operational research (OR) models relate to large fire management [19].
The shortfalls of these models and why they have not achieved operational adaptation are reviewed
in Thompson et al. [22]. In large fire management, objective measures of effectiveness are limited,
or non-existent [17,18]. Without such measures and without effective research-based fire-management
tools, it is unsurprising that incident management team (IMT) preferences can be as important as fire
and environmental factors in explaining the number and type of resources that are used, with some
IMTs using an order of magnitude more resources than others on similar wildfires [23].
Finney et al. [15] asserted that large fire suppression is qualitatively different from initial attack.
A recurring theme in suppression research [16,20,21,24] is that resources used in large fire suppression
are engaged in activities beyond what has been established in the literature; however, the nature of
these activities is yet to be established empirically. Until we identify these activities, we cannot answer
the deceptively simple question: ‘How effective is large fire suppression?’ First, a more fundamental
question must be answered: ‘How are suppression resources being used on large wildfires?’ To answer
this question, we aimed to develop a framework of large fire suppression. We begin with a descriptive
account of large fire suppression using existing Wildfire Management Agency definitions of suppression
status as a five-stage scaffold. Following this, we identify key fireline suppression tasks and determine
the temporal context of those tasks within the five stages. Finally, we contrast this work with the current
conceptualisation of resource use to identify the shortcomings in the literature. The abrupt nature
of wildfire events makes direct collection of high quality data problematic [15,20,25,26]. To address
this, we undertook a qualitative document analysis similar to the evaluation of post-fire inquiries
in Australia conducted by Bearman et al. [27]. As the principal source of information, we examined
suppression actions detailed in operational documents that are produced by wildfire management
agencies during wildfire suppression. We performed a qualitative descriptive analysis to provide a
summary of events, in the everyday terms of those events [28].
2. Materials and Methods
Three interconnected approaches were used to define how suppression unfolds through time
during major wildfires: daily reconstructions of the individual wildfires spread and suppression
response, classification of the suppression response in progressive stages and delineation of distinct
fireline tasks within those stages. An initial examination of the data led us to conclude that the smallest
identifiable unit that a meaningful assessment of stage and resource activity could be made on is a
sector of the wildfire over the course of a 24 h burn period. A sector is defined as “a specific area of an
incident which is under the control of Sector Commander who is supervising a number of crews” [29]
(p. 24). This was delineated by the morning shift change (typically 07:00) which formed a natural break
in weather, fire behaviour and operations. This division of the data is similar to the segmentation of
suppression in Mees and Strauss [30], one of the only large fire SSMs. The use of categorical stages
to describe fire status is common within fire management agencies [30–36]. The number and status
definitions vary across jurisdictions and even within single agencies over time; we used the broad
overlap of these agency status as a starting point to form an initial scaffold of five suppression stages
(Table 1). Further refinement of this scaffold was achieved by consultation with members of those
agencies and the previous field experience of the lead author. The five-stage suppression framework
permits us to deconstruct suppression operations, to classify suppression tasks and to identify how
resources are being used on large wildfires. The aim was to refine the suppression stages and determine
the suppression tasks that defined them through an iterative deductive and inductive process of
qualitative coding, analysis and consultation.
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Table 1. Fire suppression stages vs. existing agency status definitions. A representation of how the
proposed fire suppression stages map to existing agency definitions of fire status across jurisdictions.
Agency Status
This Study 1—Defensive 2—Offensive 3—Containment 4—Mop-Up 5—Patrol and Rehab
DELWP 1 Going Contained Under Control 1 Under Control 2
NSW RFS 2 Out of Control Being Controlled Under Control
QLD RFS 3 Going Contained Patrol
NSW Parks 4 Going
Being
Contained Contained Patrol
CIFFC 5 Out of Control Being Held Under Control
1 Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, Victoria, Australia [36]; 2 Rural Fire Service, New South
Wales, Australia [33]; 3 Rural Fire Service, Queensland, Australia [34]; 4 National Parks, New South Wales,
Australia [35]; 5 Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre, Canada [37].
2.1. Sources of Data
Over three thousand wildfires occurred between 2011 and 2015 in Victoria, Australia. Of these,
74 were over 500 hectares in size and, therefore, candidates for our study of large wildfires [37].
Forty-eight were discarded due to limited, missing or indecipherable spatial or resource data.
Heterogeneous sampling, a purposive sampling technique [38], was then used to select ten wildfires
from the remaining 26 to evaluate in-depth. These ten wildfires represented a range of geographic
regions, fuel types, sizes and suppression complexity (Table 2).
Table 2. Fire suppression. Selected wildfires: name, size and number of associated documents.




Containment * Primary Fuel Type
Stonyford 593 16 4 3 23 1 Grassland
Hallston 629 57 16 3 76 4 Native eucalypt forest
Powelltown 674 34 8 5 47 17 Native eucalypt forest
Corryong 2617 53 14 9 76 11 Native eucalypt forest
Morwell 2945 31 14 6 51 6 Scrub, grassland
Timbarra 3096 53 27 12 92 25 Native eucalypt forest
Lake Rowan 5710 18 5 3 26 3 Grassland
Kentbruck 12,006 95 7 8 110 7 Pinus plantation, heath
Mickleham 22,832 27 5 4 36 5 Grassland
Grampians 54,616 95 27 11 140 6 Native forest
* Number of calendar days until the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (DELWP) status for the
whole fire is ‘Contained’ (the fire spread is halted).
The data for this study were sourced from the Department of Environment, Land, Water and
Planning (DELWP) who provided access to:
1. eMap, a live incident mapping and resource tracking website (source of operational mapping
information, fire history and a simple geographic information system (GIS) viewer used to
corroborate information).
2. FireWeb, a live incident-reporting website which is their primary source of integrated fire
management information (source of Situation Reports (SitReps), Incident Shift Plans (also
known as Incident Action Plans or IAPs), archived eMap data, linescans, operational maps and
photographs).
3. GIS and mapping data from internal DELWP databases (source of real-time aircraft tracking
system (RATS) data, operational maps, mapping information and GIS spatial base layers for the
State of Victoria).
We also sourced weather station data from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (relative
humidity, temperature, wind direction and wind speed) to describe the daily fire weather conditions.
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2.2. Reconstructions
Daily wildfire reconstructions were used to contextualise the suppression efforts and provide
an understanding of the suppression achievements and wildfire response of a given burn period.
The reconstructions covered a total of 156 days across all fires, and they were based on linescans,
GIS records, operational maps, RATS, weather conditions and 674 SitReps and IAPs that included
information on the planned suppression efforts, strategies, current fire situation and other relevant
activities. IMT members from two of the wildfires were consulted to verify the accuracy of the fire
reconstructions. Summary reconstructions of the 10 wildfires are in Appendix A.
2.3. Classification of Stages
For the suppression stages, a directed content analysis was applied whereby a ‘scaffold’ [38] of five
stages was used as initial coding categories to code the data [39]. Initially, the lead author (experienced
wildland firefighter) and one other researcher independently coded the suppression stages based on
a holistic view [40] of what happened during each 24 h burn period at a sector level. Substantial
agreement was achieved for two wildfires that the coders overlapped on. Further refinements to the
suppression stages were made by again consulting with industry experts and by the two coders jointly
analysing and recoding a common wildfire. Finally, all 10 wildfires were revisited to ensure consistency,
and the comments from the SitReps and IAPs were coded into the suppression stages as nodes using
NVivo11 software.
2.4. Classification of Tasks
Content analysis [41] employing NVivo11 software was used to code and analyse the comments
from the SitReps and IAPs for discrete suppression tasks. Process codes [40] were developed from
broad categories of suppression activities that are readily identifiable from the suppression literature or
are in common usage in fire management agencies. Then, these broad activity nodes were ‘charted’ [42]
into a matrix with the suppression stage nodes. Each cross-referenced set of text was re-examined




Figure 1 is a conceptual map of suppression resulting from our analysis of the charted stages and
activities. Our iterative qualitative analysis of ten large wildfires revealed the considerable complexity
of suppression effort. Overall, we identified and delineated 20 distinct suppression tasks (white
boxes, Figure 1). Detailed descriptions of each task are given in Appendix B. While the five stages are
explained in detail in the next section, key aspects that delineate the stages are:
1. Defensive Suppression—The fire behaviour is beyond the control capacity of the
suppression resources.
2. Offensive Suppression—The suppression resources are making ‘gains’ on the fire. Plans are
emerging and being executed.
3. Containment Achieved—In a post-hoc analysis, this is the clearest stage to delineate. A control
line has been established along the entirety of the sector or division, and subsequent mop-up
activities are expected to hold the fire at this perimeter.
4. Mop-Up—While mop-up activities occur to some degree in stages 2–5, complete mop-up of some
depth (typically a 30 m perimeter) is the focus of this stage.
5. Patrol and Rehabilitation—The fire is still smouldering in the interior or in isolated hotspots on the
perimeter. Perimeter mop-up is almost complete, and resources can be freed up for rehabilitation
or demobilisation. The boundary between stages 4 and 5 is the fuzziest.
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No mally, an rdinal progression through the stages occurs unless there is an ‘escape’ or rekindling
at which point a sector or even the whole fire can revert back to an earlier stage. The defensive stage
did not occur on all wildfires, and different stages can and often do occur concurrently on different
sectors of a wildfire.
3.2. Characteristics of Stages and Activities
3.2.1. Stage 1—Defensive Suppression
The key characteristic of the defensive suppression stage was that the current or expected fire
behaviour exceeds the suppression control capacity [43]. Classification of this stage was made when
there was a combination of sustained dangerous fire behaviour over the majority of burn period
and largely unsuccessful or unattempted containment efforts (Table 3). Dangerous fire behaviour
was defined by reports of escalating fire activity and intensity, an organised head or fire front,
and uncontrollable spotting. The focus of the suppression effort in wildland urban interface areas was
asset protection, whereas firefighter safety was prioritised on remote wildfires and ground resources
were not dispatched until the fire behaviour was moderated. For ground resources, asset protection
was prioritised over containment efforts, and aerial resources were directed to either assist with asset
protection or slow the running fire (Table 3).
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Table 3. Illustrative excerpts of unsuccessful, unattempted, and defensive suppression.
Activity Excerpt from SitRep or IAP Source Fire
Unsuccessful
“The fire is burning in a South Westerly direction and has spotted over a
ridge at XE 240064.4 helitak are working (including the Air Crane) on
the running edge but having a limited influence at this stage [44] (p. 2).”
Grampians
Unattempted
“Fire is in very steep, remote and inaccessible country. Nearest vehicle
tracks not suitable for float of machinery. Direct attack with hand crews




“Crews focusing on asset protection with the assistance of air support.
Air support being used to slow the spread of head fire and spread of
eastern flank [46] (p. 2).”
Mickleham
An example of limited duration defensive suppression occurred on the Corryong wildfire with
reports of “[i]ncreased fire activity this afternoon, spotting 100 m uphill—not confident of holding
the fire within containment lines this afternoon (increased winds). Ground crews and contractors
have now been withdrawn to a safer location [47]”. However, a few hours later, the crews had
re-engaged, and it was reported that the “[f]ire activity from the afternoon of 21 January has settled
down and fire remains within containment lines” [48]. The defensive response in this situation did
not merit inclusion into the defensive stage as the dangerous fire behaviour was limited in duration,
the crews re-engaged after a brief disruption and the fire remained within the intended containment
area. Defensive suppression occurred on eight of the ten wildfires (Powelltown and Stonyford did
not manifest this stage). Defensive suppression was a prominent part of the three wildland urban
interface wildfires (Grampians, Mickleham and Morwell) that had prolonged periods of dangerous
fire behaviour, asset protection efforts and substantial asset damage. One wildfire (Lake Rowan) had
limited information about the initial burn period, and defensive suppression was inferred from reports
of rapid fire growth and asset protection. The initial burn periods of two remote wildfires (Corryong
and Timbarra) were classified as defensive because ground resources were not dispatched due to
the expected fire behaviour conditions. The defensive suppression classification for two wildfires
(Kentbruck and Hallston) was the result of unsuccessful suppression efforts that necessitated further
asset protection.
3.2.2. Stage 2—Offensive Suppression
Stage two was characterised by deliberate containment efforts as opposed to the reactionary
response of stage one. Suppression resources successfully suppress active fire, contain spot fires and
retard fire behaviour that had the potential to exceed the control capacity. Resources were used to
establish control and contingency lines, conduct burning operations, identify and clear hazard trees,
mop up and prepare assets for potential future impact (Table 4). Damage assessments and recovery
operations initiated on three wildfires (Mickleham, Morwell, and Grampians) by non-fireline personnel
have not been included in the tasks of this stage. Fire behaviour was heterogeneous and ranged from
limited, characterised by intermittent hotspots along an inactive edge, to aggressive, where a running
fire edge with spotting and control line breaches may occur. Excerpts from a single wildfire (Timbarra)
exemplify this range (Table 4).
Forests 2019, 10, 884 7 of 30
Table 4. Illustrative excerpts of the range of offensive suppression tasks and fire behaviour.
Activity Excerpt from SitRep or IAP Source Fire
Retard Fire
Behaviour
“Significant air-attack support is available today to prevent the fire
developing a head [49] (p. 2).” Kentbruck
Contain Spot
Fires
“There have been spotovers during the day which have been addressed
utilising aircraft and direct attack [50] (p. 2).” Lake Rowan
Mop Up and
Control Lines
“Crews to continue to black out hotspots in forest and running edge in the
grass lands, Plant being used to cut breaks in grasslands [51] (p. 2).” Morwell
Contingency
Lines
“Prepare fallback lines as identified on operations overview map. Pheasent
Creek Tk-Commins D6 (Swifts Ck) working days brushing up from Buenba
Rd. Dart Tk-Potocnik D6 and McInnes Exc & float [52] (p. 9).”
Corryong
Burning
“Burning off along Mt Difficult Rd has reached Mt Victory Rd (8 km
ignited). Burning out has also commenced along the Mt Zero Rd, north of
Heatherlie (0.5 km ignited). Burning out will continue throughout today




“Excavator to work on hazardous trees on Donavan Creek Sector Priority 1:




“To patrol area and undertake asset protection when required across the
Drik Drik Division and Dartmoor area. Intelligence gathering and
familiarisation of assets and access in area between Wanwin Rd and
Munbannar-Wanwin Rd. [54] (p. 9).”
Kentbruck
Fire Behaviour Excerpt from SitRep or IAP Source Fire
Limited “Fire Activity quiet over all sectors, very quiet over northern parts due torain [55] (pp. 1–2).” Timbarra
Moderate “Crew walked into fire, active edge on fire—burning in rocky terrain inareas with no rocks flame heights are approximately 1 m [56] (p. 2).” Timbarra
Aggressive
“The 3 smaller spot overs on the on the eastern side are contained using
Dozer, hand crews and water bombing. The larger breakout on the eastern
side is still not contained. Fire on the western side continued to run today
towards 2013 fuel reduction burn. Was slowed by aerial retardant
drops [57] (p. 1).”
Timbarra
3.2.3. Stage 3—Containment Achieved
The key characteristic of the containment stage was fully established control lines along the
wildfire perimeter for the full length of the sector or division. Unless there was a later breach, this was
the final wildfire perimeter. The assignment of this stage centred on either explicit references of
progress and completion (Table 5) or inference when there was no further resource tasking that related
to the establishment of control lines. Progress updates were interpreted in the context of previous and
subsequent updates as the reports for the fire as a whole fire rarely coincided exactly with completion
in a given sector. For the six wildfires with significant burning operations (Corryong, Grampians,
Kentbruck, Powelltown, Stonyford and Timbarra), containment was achieved once the perimeter
adjacent to the control line was burnt in. A distinction was made between perimeter burning operations,
where ground crews were used to establish a perimeter burn along the control line, and interior burning
operations that used aerial ignition techniques. A variety of suppression tasks continued during the
containment stage, including establishing contingency control lines, hazard tree abatement, mop-up
and patrol. If critical recovery efforts were required, fireline personnel were used to facilitate access to
infrastructure for non-fireline personnel. Fire behaviour in stage three was most commonly reported
as ‘quiet’, although there were also escalations that included ‘minor flare-ups’ inside the control lines
and isolated spotfires; these escalations were managed by ground and aerial suppression resources.
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Table 5. Illustrative excerpts of the progress of control line and burning operations.
Activity Excerpt from SitRep or IAP Source Fire
Control Line
Progress
“2 sections of approx. 1 km each are untracked in forested areas. 2nd Dozer
Is on-route to assist with this [58] (p. 2).” Morwell
Control Line
Completion
“Control lines established today with dozer in Boweya Forest Block and
Orchard Tk sections and held throughout day [59] (p. 2).” Lake Rowan
Burning
Progress
“Kings Creek Tk Sector back burn has continued and progressed well
overnight. 250 m of edge remains to the Gibbo River (Benambra Corryong
Rd) at 0545 this may be completed by shift changeover [60] (p. 2).”
Corryong
“Crews have started to burn the last 150 m of unburnt edge, reports from




“Dozer line complete on Southern sector between Scoullers Road and
Ansons Road at 22:30. Fire is completely tracked. [ . . . ] Burning out
commenced between dozer line and fire edge near Scoullers





“Strengthening of edges has been successful during the day. Combination
of ADT and hand lighting has increased depth to 100 m plus in most sectors
within the Cobboboonee Division. Burning out within fire area will
continue for several days [63] (p. 2).”
Kentbruck
Control lines did not guarantee containment. Spotting occurred on all ten wildfires after control
lines were established, and half had sizable control lines breaches. Control lines on one wildfire
(Kentbruck) were breached by the burning operations that had been used to establish the perimeter.
Two wildfires (Hallston and Morwell) had breaches occur during the burn period that followed
the initial control line establishment, whereas the breaches on two other wildfires (Powelltown and
Timbarra) occurred several days after.
3.2.4. Stage 4—Mop-Up
In stage four, there was no longer a need to establish perimeter control lines, and the absence of
this task defined the beginning of this stage. Throughout the stage, the central focus was full perimeter
mop-up to a depth of 30 m, or greater if extreme conditions were forecast (Table 6). Burning operations
in stage four were limited to burning out interior patches. The largest area burnt by these interior
burning operations was ~3000 hectares (Kentbruck), followed by two ~1000 hectare burns (Grampians).
Hazard tree abatement efforts were completed. The ongoing construction of contingency lines that
occurred in this stage may reflect a risk mitigation strategy due to the prevalence of spotting and
control line breaches on all ten wildfires, emphasising that completed control lines did not guarantee
containment. Recovery efforts escalated from facilitating access, as in stage three, to fireline resources
engaged in clean-up efforts. The end of stage four was defined by three tasks: Perimeter hotspot
numbers were reduced to the point that thermal imaging, such as forward-looking infrared (FLIR)
cameras being used to identify individual hotspots; wildfire rehabilitation requirements were assessed
and had begun to be implemented; and there was a shift back towards the use of local crews alone.
3.2.5. Stage 5—Patrol and Rehabilitation
Mop-up in the patrol and rehabilitation stage was limited to isolated hotspots that were missed
in stage four (Table 7). The isolated hotspots were identified by thermal imaging, either a handheld
thermal imaging camera (TIC) or helicopter-mounted FLIR, and maps or coordinates of the hotspots
were provided to crews that were tasked to patrol the fire perimeter. Incident management transitioned
from IMTs to local suppression crews and the SitReps and IAP information during this stage was
succinct; the control strategy was often recorded as ‘patrol and mop-up where required’ or even just
‘patrol’. Other than patrol and mop-up, a key identifier in this stage was the primacy of the recovery
and rehabilitation efforts. Fire behaviour in the patrol and rehabilitation stage was usually limited to
the isolated hotspots. In addition, there was the occasional specific location or area of concern identified
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that required additional suppression efforts. On occasions when conditions worsened considerably,
active fire behaviour occurred in unburnt areas within the control lines, but this fire activity did not
present challenges to control (Table 7).
Table 6. Illustrative excerpts of suppression activities during the mop-up stage.
Activity Excerpt from SitRep or IAP Source Fire
Mop-up Depth “Patrol and blackout to a good 30 m depth on all control lines [64] (p. 3).” Powelltown
“Patrol and black to a depth of 60 m. (Forcast extreme conditions next
Tuesday) [65] (p. 8).” Grampians
Burning
“Burn out unburnt fuel north of Hurdle Flat Rd between Glenelg National
Park and the Kentbruck forest to ensure no break out to the south when fire
comes under the influence of northerly winds on Thursday or Friday [66]
(p. 5).”
Kentbruck
Rehabilitation “Prepare and implement rehabilitation plans for all Sectors [67] (p. 6).” Mickleham
Clean-Up “Remove debris from private property (north of Forresters Rd) [68] (p. 5).” Hallston
Hazard Trees “Excavator on line to assist in tree removal to allow roads to be opened [69](p. 2).” Morwell
“A limitation in the number of skilled tree assessors and fallers is slowing
the opening of some roads [70] (p. 2).” Grampians
Limited
Hotspots
“Crew attended to one flare up this morning and was able to contain
internal fire spread. FLIR is arranged for this morning to identify any
additional hotspots [71] (p. 2).”
Mickleham
Table 7. Illustrative excerpts of suppression and fire behaviour in the patrol stage.
Activity Excerpt from SitRep or IAP Source Fire
Patrol “Only a minor number of hotspots found well within containment lines.All edges secured. CONTROL STRATEGY Patrol [72] (p. 2).” Lake Rowan
FLIR Identified
Hotspots
“FLIR run undertaken yesterday. Crews deployed to black out hot spots.
FLIR run arranged for Monday. Air recon this morning over the fire picked
up only a few smokers [73] (p. 2).”
Morwell
Rehabilitation
“Old fence line clearing almost complete. 50% of fencing repairs complete.
10% of fencing replacement complete. Rehabilitation of control lines
underway [74] (p. 2).”
Hallston
Demobilisation
“Significant progress has been made in the last few days. The complete
perimeter of the fire is secured, no breakaway is expected. Formal transfer
of control to CFA District 6 will take place at 1900 hrs. IMT will stand down
at 1930 hrs after debrief [75] (p. 2).”
Stonyford
Fire Behaviour Excerpt from SitRep or IAP Source Fire
Characteristic
Fire Behaviour
“Mild, stable conditions continue today. No active fire reported, some
hotspots still visible [76] (p. 2).” Hallston
Specific Area of
Concern
“At 0354 h a hotspot was discovered at Grid Reference 288,177 in the East
Sector which has been identified as requiring suppression efforts from a




“Strong westerly winds (50–65 km/h) are reigniting hot spots within the fire
perimeter. Continue black out and patrolling of eastern flanks of the fire.
Some running edge within fire perimeter, burning unburnt fuel well within
fire boundary [78] (pp. 1–2).”
Lake Rowan
3.3. Resource Use by Sector and Stage
The sector level assessment by stage yields a drastically different picture of resource use than
what is assumed by the current conceptual model of suppression, illustrated by SSMs. This model of
suppression and the related productivity research assumes that the focus of resource use is establishing
control/contingency lines, which relates to only two (establish control lines, construct contingency
control lines) of the 12 tasks we identified in stage 2 and 3. Currently, there are no measures of resource
requirements or estimates of productivity for the other 10 tasks in these two stages, nor for any tasks in
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stages 1, 4 and 5. We quantified this shortfall with the daily sector level assessment of stages, which we
illustrate with a graph using the number of daily ground crews as a proxy for resource use on a single
wildfire (Figure 2; graphs of all ten wildfires are in Appendix C). Other than command staff, equipment
operators and pilots, the ground crew figure includes all fireline personnel. Only 45% of resource use
falls within stages 2 and 3 (43% for all 10 wildfires). The magnitude of this shortfall is masked by
DELWPs-reported whole-fire containment status, which boosts ‘containment’ resource use to 71%,
which is the percentage of resources used until the wildfire was ‘contained’—according to DELWP,
equivalent to stage 3—at the end of the 7th day of the fire [63]. The current dataset does not permit the
attribution of resource use at the individual task level; however, with the sector level stage assessment,
we estimated that at least 57% of resource use on our sample of 10 large wildfires falls outside of current
suppression modelling and productivity research. Sectors of large wildfires commonly differ on the
stage of suppression attained on any given day, which provides empirical support to the overlapping
phases of suppression described in Figure 1 of Plucinski [17]. The sector-based assessment of fire status
along with an explicit knowledge of stage-based suppression tasks gives a comprehensive insight
into the complexity of large fire suppression. Such an understanding should be the starting point for
resource planning, productivity estimates, and fire suppression modelling.
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Figure 2. The left y axis is the number of ground crew (all fireline personnel except co and staff,
equipment operators and pilots), classified in sectors by stage, which is used as a proxy for fire resource
use. Existing resource easures apply to a limited number of tasks occurring in stages 2 and 3
(a maximum of 45% of resource use).
4. Discussion
Through this work, we have established that suppression can be thought of as a multistage process
inv lving a variety of activities and tasks, which contrasts the existing suppression literature and SSMs
that represent sup r ssion as a continuous process of establishing a control line around a growing fire.
Reframing suppression and expandi g the list of critical tasks is a first step towards determining the
eff ctive ess of suppression on large wildfires. In doing this, we have elucidated the complexity of
stages and task that constitute large fire s ppression (Figure 1).
Many fire manage ent a i f t ese suppression stages to cla sify wildfires,
which begs t , hy develop new stage definitions? The different agency classifications
ar g nerally understood w thin each agency through practice and experience, bu this implicit, tacit
understanding does not exte t t elli g. The five stages are
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explicit categories that focus on resource use and suppression impact and are readily understandable
to a wider audience. Each stage evokes a set of associated fire behaviour, suppression activities
and tasks that assist in identifying the potential resources needs. Like the fuels, topography and
weather [15] of large wildfires, suppression is also heterogeneous. The stages are more useful as a
tool when we examine suppression at a sector level, rather than the whole fire. This shift away from a
blanket status for a whole fire, which is the convention of fire management agencies, allows for greater
refinement of the resource needs and illustrates the gaps between the suppression literature and SSMs
and fireline operations. The sector level evaluation is less ambiguous and can be used to redefine the
risk of rekindling to a more precise geographic location which could combat the overly conservative
assessment of the suppression status that was found by Katuwal et al. [16].
Wildfires are rapidly evolving events, and the operational data generated during these events
were not recorded for the purpose of research; therefore, some level of inaccuracy is to be expected.
Judgement, repeated examination and cross-referencing of information was required to piece together
a chain of events for each wildfire and resolve discrepancies, examples of inaccuracies included:
1. Erroneously repeated information—the entire content of a previous SitRep was often copied to
form a draft of a new SitRep, at which point one or more key pieces of information was edited
and updated. This resulted in verbatim information persisting in subsequent documents that
may no longer be relevant or even be contradicted by the updated information.
2. Delayed recording—updates in the SitReps were not always a full update of the whole fire. There
was often a lag in record keeping, for example, a linescan with an accurate size and location of
the fire may occur in the morning, but the size may not have been updated in the records until
much later in the day.
3. Planned vs. actual events—records include the plans for a day or a shift that may not have
actually occurred. An indication of the completion status of planned works or whether plans
were abandoned was not always provided.
4. The records were rife with spelling errors, name changes, local geographic references,
abbreviations, shifting geographic boundaries and jargon.
5. Resource numbers and locations were not always recorded accurately—tabulated numbers may
be contradicted by written descriptions, and appliances (trucks, etc.) may be listed without the
crew numbers to staff them or resource numbers carried forward on records when resources were
no longer present.
6. Multiple wildfires may have been managed by the same IMT and records for one fire may include
information for multiple events.
The reconstructions were a lengthy and time-consuming process due to the data issues mentioned
above. The ten wildfires considered were all in Victoria, Australia. The applicability of these findings
for other areas is unknown and requires further study as the configuration of ground resources varies
across countries (e.g., USA hotshot hand crews, prevalent use of portable pumps and hoses in flat
boreal forests of Canada, and tanker-based suppression in Australia). Given the consultation with both
in- and out-of-state experts, international deployment of wildland firefighters and resources and the
international wildfire experience of the lead author, it is reasonable to assume that similar activities
occur on large wildfires elsewhere.
A caveat to this work is that it generates discrete ridged definitions (the stages and tasks) from a
fluid process (suppression). Firefighting and operational data do not always fit with discrete sampling,
and there were some instances when tasks fell outside of the designated stages. Some examples are
a short period of defensive suppression on the Corryong wildfire that was not representative of the
whole 24 h burn period, or that the final sections of the control lines on the Hallston wildfire were
completed during the Patrol stage, as the fire-ground received a large amount of rain and control line
construction had to be revisited after the ground dried out enough to permit access. Quantification of
the frequency of the tasks or their relative importance was not possible. In post-hoc operational data,
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the absence of a task does not indicate that it did not occur; the only conclusion that can be made is that
it was not recorded. In addition, the number of documents per wildfire is nonstandard, and there is
erroneously repeated information, so conclusions based on frequency would be problematic. We hope
that our analysis will ultimately lead to better and more systematic record keeping that may produce
the kind of data that would allow such an analysis. Until there is better record keeping, it would
be prudent to not to make conclusions based on frequency. Finally, there was limited descriptive
information about the suppression operations when suppression progressed to the Mop-Up and Patrol
and Rehabilitation stages and the transition from the end of the Mop-Up stage to the start of the Patrol
stage was a matter of degree.
There are a number of implications to this work. Production rates for suppression resources that
have been developed by field observations [79] or post-hoc whole fire economic analysis [16,20,26] feed
into the SSMs. The majority of the activities and tasks that we identify in Figure 1 lack both production
rates and incorporation in SSMs. However, SSMs are being used to determine the adequacy resources
on individual fires and for agencies as a whole [80,81]. There are three problems with this:
1. Extending production rates derived from field observations [79] of one of the 20 tasks that we
identified as a proxy for resource needs would lead to chronic under-resourcing because resources
are required to carry out a much broader range of tasks. This is supported by the findings of
Haven et al. [82] that observed production rates are overly optimistic.
2. Using production rates from post-hoc whole fire assessments [16,20,26] may lead to over-resourcing
because the production rates include the completion of unaccounted tasks, (e.g., Katuwal et al. [20],
where ground crews had an anomalous negative result).
3. Resourcing for a fraction of the required tasks may result in the wrong bundle (type and amount)
of resources because we do not understand how the resources are being used.
Of all the activities and tasks that we identified, the size and scope of the burning operations
have the greatest significance for future suppression research. Recent technical literature on burning
operations is limited to a small number of numerical simulations of suppression burning [83–85].
The experimental work of Wilson [86], which derived an equation for the width of a firebreak required
to stop a grassfire, noted that in practice, burning operations would be important, but they were not
included in Wilson’s experiment. Burning operations occurred on six of the ten wildfires (Corryong,
Grampians, Kentbruck, Powelltown, Stonyford and Timbarra), and some were of substantial size;
the largest was an estimated 3000 hectares on the Kentbruck wildfire, followed by two areas of
approximately 1000 hectares on one sector of the Grampians wildfire. These burning operations
generally made use of the existing road network and without examining this suppression task one
might assume that it was the roads, rather than the suppression resources that stopped the fire as
in Narayanaraj and Winberly [87]. Burning operations that result in significant fire spread have the
potential to distort post-hoc analyses of fire behaviour and its determinants if unaccounted for. Burning
operations are not always revealed by the final fire perimeter or remote imagery (satellite/aerial photos).
Currently, this potential distortion is largely unquantified in the literature. Operational data should be
consulted to ensure appropriate differentiation between unplanned and planned sources of fire spread.
Technologies have improved, and geographic resource tracking has expanded beyond aviation
resources. This may provide new methods for determining resource productivity. Operational data
coupled with these improvements will be needed to tie productivity and resource requirements to
the tasks that we identified. As we come to better understand how resources are being used on large
wildfires, we will be better able to model suppression and improve our measures of effectiveness.
This could result in numerous improvements in response planning, risk management, cost effectiveness
and, perhaps most importantly, a more effective and safer operational response.
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5. Conclusions
Using document analysis for a sample of ten major fires, we framed large wildfire suppression as
a typical progression of fire sectors through a series of five discrete stages as opposed to the initial
attack concept of suppression as a process of continuous control line construction as depicted by SSMs.
The key features of the stages are:
1. Defensive: The fire behaviour is beyond the control capacity of the suppression resources.
The focus is firefighter safety, asset protection and slowing the fire.
2. Offensive: The suppression resources are making ‘gains’ on the fire. Plans are emerging and
being executed. The largest range in fire behaviour and suppression actions occurs in this stage.
3. Containment: A control line has been established along the entirety of the sector or division,
and subsequent mop-up activities are expected to hold the fire at this perimeter.
4. Mop-Up: While mop-up activities occur to some degree in stages 2–5, complete mop-up of some
depth (typically a 30 m perimeter) is the focus of this stage.
5. Patrol and Rehabilitation: The fire is still smouldering in the interior or in isolated hotspots on the
perimeter. Perimeter mop-up is almost complete, and resources can be freed up for rehabilitation
or demobilisation.
A whole-fire assessment of containment distorts resource use as sectors of large wildfires commonly
differ on the stage of suppression attained on any given day. Within the stages, we identified 20 explicit
suppression tasks; there are no guidelines to mandate the allocation of resources or productivity
measures of 18 of the 20 tasks that we identified. The full suite of suppression tasks should be
considered whenever a fire suppression model is constructed and used to explore the effectiveness of
suppression and related research questions.
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Appendix A
Below are brief reconstructions of the 10 wildfires considered in this article. As the wildfires were
assessed over the course of a 24 h burn period, starting at 07:00. The daily mapped fire extent represents
the fire location at the beginning of the day. The fire extent for day 1 is represented by the point of
origin. ‘Day 2’ on the fire progression maps is approximately 07:00 on the day after ignition. Regular,
unambiguous mapping throughout the fire duration would make generating such progression maps
much simpler. The depth or external extent of the burning operations was estimated.
Appendix A.1 Stonyford
Aircraft (CFA response) started flying to the Stonyford wildfire (Figure A1) at 15:13, prior to the
first DELWP record at 16:23 on the 5th of February. By 18:00, the forward spread was halted, and the
fire was estimated to be 450 hectares. This is the smallest wildfire in the dataset by area, but it had the
largest first-day response from ground crew (415), as well as substantive aerial resource use; 27 h of
flight-time which included 4 h by fixed-wing birddog aircraft, 8 h by 2 light helicopters, and 15 h by 3
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medium/heavy helicopters. Three sides of the fire used existing roads as control lines; the last side
was a dozer line connecting the roads, which was completed by midnight on the first day. Limited
burning operations were completed overnight on the 2nd day (6–7 February 2014). Perimeter mop-up
depths were extended beyond what was detailed on other wildfires as adverse weather conditions
were expected to occur on the 5th day.Forests 2019, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 31 
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Appendix A.2 Hallston
At 1 : t e 26th of March 2013, it was reported that a prescri ed burn had been spotted
~300 m south of the intended burn area, i niting the Hallston wildfire (Figure A2). A 100 m wide
head-fire initially spre d in a south–w s direction. Early in the morning (05:35) on the second day,
the fire was 49 hectares and par ially c tained on the north, east and south sides. The fire was
spotted over the control lin s gain in the early afternoon (13:32) on the 2nd day. By that evening,
i was reported to be 320 hectares and still growing, and crews were engaged in asset protection.
The fi e conti ued to burn vernight and approached e limit of its grow in the morning of the
3rd day (28 Janu y 2012) when it started to rain. Som limited burning operations occurred du ing
con ainment efforts, but primarily containment was achieved with direct attack in conjunction with the
rain. Final c mpletio of mechanical co trol lin in the forested areas occurred days after the fire
sprea had halted as it was too wet and unsuitabl for heavy equipment.
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exceeding the intended burn area and one operation ceasing because the fire would not spread. 
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Appendix A.3 Powelltown
The Po llt il fire (Figure A3) started in n active logging coupe and was cont ined
at 22 h ctares on 27 January 2014. In the morning (11:18) of 9 February 2014, nine days after the
last suppression pres nce, th fire rekindled and grew over three-hundr d h ctares to an es imated
350 hectares the morning of 10 February 2014. A plan was developed by midnight 2 September 2014 to
use the existing road network to contai t fire. i rations occu red along the
roads and short stretches of ec i i t til the evening of 12 February
2014, when the fire was contained. I i erations, such as one section
exce ding the intended burn area and one r ti fi t r .
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suppression on the first day, and the direct attack strategy enacted on the second day was abandoned. 
Aerial suppression was used to slow the fire while burning operations occurred. Two of four sides of 
the fire were contained with burning operations that used existing roads. The burning operations 
were extended along a newly constructed dozer line (~4 km), and there were plans to burn along the 
existing road to contain the final side, but a dozer line was constructed along the fire edge instead. 
This was due to a weather change on the 24 January 2014, which included significant rain. Control 
line construction and burning operations took longer than expected, and hazard tree work was an 
ongoing impediment. Extensive work was done to clear existing roads as contingency lines. 
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ppe dix .4 Corryong
wo lightning fires that were reported on 16 and 17 January 2014 in a remote forested area merged
together on 19 January 2014 as the Timbarra wildfire (Figure A4). There was only aerial suppression
on the first day, and the direct attack strategy enacted on the second day was abandoned. Aerial
suppression was used to slow the fire while burning operations occurred. Two of four sides of the
fire were contained with burning operations that used existing roads. The burning operations were
extended along a newly constructed dozer line (~4 km), and there were plans to burn along the existing
road to contain the fin l side, but a dozer line was constructed along the fire edge instead. This was due
to a we ther change on t 24 J uary 2014, which included significa t rain. Control li e co struction
and burning operations took longer than expected, and hazard tree work was n ongoing impediment.
Extensive work was done to clear existing roads as contingency lines.
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assets, plantations and a mill and private residences. The first report (14:46) of the second ignition 
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associated with the second ignition (~759 hectares) merged with the initial fire, but the two fires were 
managed as one incident. There were no further significant suppression challenges following the 
period of rapid wildfire growth on 9–10 February 2014 as a ~315 hectare burn area within the 
Hazelwood Mine was excised for separate management due to the specialised suppression 
requirements of a coal mine fire. 
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Appendix A.5 Morwell
The first report (15:18) of the first of two human-caused ignitions on the Morwell wildfire
(Figure A5) was on 7 February 2014. The CFA responded to the first fire and it was contained at
156 hectares on 8 February 2014. Early in the afternoon (13:12), the fire was spotted beyond the control
lines and, at 591 hectares, it was spreading toward substantive assets, including public infrastructure,
mining assets, plantations and a mill and private residences. The first report (14:46) of the second
ignitio was on 9 February 2014. By early evening (17:37), the fire was reported to be 2800 ectares,
there was extensive spotting and multiple assets were being impacted. It is not clear whether the
burn area associat d with the second ignition (~759 hectares) merged with the initial fire, but th
two fires were managed as on incident. There were o further significant suppression challenges
following the period of rapid wildfire growth on 9–10 Febru ry 2014 as a ~315 hectare burn area
within the Hazelwood Mine was excised for separate management due to the specialised i
requirements of a coal mine fire.
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improvements were made to the existing road network to enable its use as a control line for burning 
operations. Burning operations started on 12 February 2014 with a burn extending ~7 km that reached 
a depth of ~100 m from the road, and they continued until 14 February 2014, when they encompassed 
three sides of the fire and were halted by rain. Adverse weather on 19 February 2014 resulted in the 
fire spotting outside of the intended burn area. Burning operations resumed on 21 February 2014 and 
continued on intermittent days until 3 March 2014. This fire was managed as a part of a complex of 
fires which obscured the multistage process until later in the fire management (the 17th day). The fire 
overran another lightning-caused fire (Ensay-Dinner Creek Track) that that had been contained to 0.3 
hectares on 4 February 2014. 
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Appendix A.6 Timbarra
The Timbarra wildfire (Figure A6) was reported in the afternoon (13:51) of 8 February 2014. For two
days, direct attack with ground crews was deemed to be too dangerous and aerial suppression resources
were used exclusively. Ground resources accessed the fire on 10 February 2014, and improvements
were made to the existing road network to enable its use as a control line for burning operations.
Burning operations started on 12 February 2014 with a burn extending ~7 km that reached a depth of
~100 m from the road, and they continued until 14 February 2014, when they encompassed three sides
of the fire and were halted by rain. Adverse weather on 19 February 2014 resulted in the fire spotting
outside of the intended burn area. Burning operations resumed on 21 February 2014 and continued
on intermittent days until 3 March 2014. This fire was managed as a part of a complex of fires which
obscured the multistage process until later in the fire management (the 17th day). The fire overran
another lightning-caused fire (Ensay-Dinner Creek Track) that that had been contained to 0.3 hectares
on 4 February 2014.
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Protection of rural assets was the focus of suppression during the first day of the rapidly growing 
Lake Rowan wildfire (Figure A7), which was estimated to be over 1000 hectares an hour and a half 
after the first report (15:50) on 16 December 2014. By 19:00, the fire had burned ~15 km from the point 
of origin, and further fire behaviour and spread was moderated by milder overnight weather. 
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areas. Fire spread was relatively limited after the first burn period, and there were burning operations 
overnight in the treed areas on the night of the 18th and 20th of December. 
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Appendix A.7 Lake Rowan
Protection of rural assets as the foc s f s ressi ri t e first a f t e ra i l r i
Lake Rowan wildfire (Figure 7), ic s sti t t r t r s r lf
after the fir t r rt (15:50) on 16 December 2014. By 19:00, the fire had burned ~15 k from the
point of origin, and fu ther fir behaviour and spread was moderated by milder overnight eather.
Graders were used to establish contr l li i r r l , il i
areas. Fire spread as relatively li ited fter t fi t ,
overnight in the tre d areas on the night of the 18th and 20th of ece ber.
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Appendix A.8. Kentbruck 
The Kentbruck wildfire (Figure A8) was human-caused and started along the highway on 4 
January 2013. Within minutes of the first report (14:36), the fire was estimated at 55 hectares with 
flames crowning 20 m above the treetops in a pine plantation. The fire grew to 160 hectares, running 
1.25 km in 1.5 h in an easterly direction. Within 5 h, the fire was 670 hectares, and it had been spotted 
over three roads to the east and an unnamed track to the north. By 21:00, aerial suppression ended, 
and the fire was 1270 hectares, and containment burning operations had begun. Outside the pine 
plantation, the fire burned in swampy, inaccessible heathland, inducing a containment strategy of 
aerial suppression and burning operations along existing roads. By estimate, half the final burn area 
was the direct result of burning operations which occurred over eight days. The burning operations 
on the third day exceeded the intended burn, which ultimately resulted in an extra ~3000 hectares of 
fire growth beyond what had originally been intended. 
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Appendix A.8 Kentbruck
The Kentbruck wildfire (Figure A8) was human-caused and started along the highway on 4 January
2013. Within minutes of the first report (14:36), the fire was estimated at 55 hectares with flames
crowning 20 m above the treetops in a pine plantation. The fire grew to 160 hectares, running 1.25
km in 1.5 h in an easterly direction. Within 5 h, the fire was 670 hectares, and it had been spotted
over three roads to the east and an unnamed track to the north. By 21:00, aerial suppression ended,
and the fire was 1270 hectares, and containment burning operations had begun. Outside the pine
plantation, the fire burned in s a py, inaccessible heathland, inducing a contain ent strategy of
aerial suppression and burning operations along existing roads. By esti ate, half the final burn area
as the direct result of burning operations which occurred over eight days. The burning operations on
the third day exceeded the intended burn, which ultimately resulted in an extra ~3000 hectares of fire
growth beyond what had originally been intended.
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change resulted in rapid fire growth to the north, and 3930 hectares were burnt within four hours 
(15:58). Resources focused on asset protection as this is an interface area close to Melbourne, Victoria. 
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abated overnight but spotting was occurring again by noon of the 2nd day when another period of 
significant growth occurred (8683 hectares), which necessitated defensive firefighting and the 
evacuation of the Kilmore Township. There were no significant burning operations recorded, and 
many of the machine control lines were constructed after the fire was contained by wetlines. The 
initial suppression response was moderated by existence of a second large interface wildfire within 
25 km of the point of origin. 
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Appendix A.9 Mickleham
This Mickleham wildfire (Figure A9) initially spread in a southwesterly direction and reached
~150 hectares within two hours of the first report (12:46) on the 9 February 2014. A southerly wind
change resulted in rapid fire growth to the north, and 3930 hectares were burnt within four hours
(15:58). Resources focused on asset protection as this is an interface area close to Melbourne, Victoria.
By midnight, the fire was ~10,000 hectares and still burning in a northerly direction. Fire activity abated
overnight but spotting was occurring again by noon of the 2nd day when another period of significant
growth occurred (8683 hectares), which necessitated defensive firefighting and the evacuation of the
Kilmore Township. There were no significant burning operations recorded, and many of the machine
control lines were constructed after the fire was contained by wetlines. The initial suppression response
was moderated by existence of a second large interface wildfire within 25 km of the point of origin.
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The first report of seven ignitions in the Grampians wildfire Complex (Figure A10) was at 09:04 
on the 15th of January. Four ignitions were contained prior to being overrun by the rapidly growing 
wildfire that resulted when multiple ignitions that were ~3 km apart joined on 16 January 2014. In 
the late morning (10:25) of 16 January 2014, there were signs of column interactions between two 
fires, one of which had grown to 100 hectares. By 14:08, the fires joined, and subsequently (17:37), 
assets in a southerly direction (Smiths Road) were being impacted, and fire was ~1600 hectares. In 
the early morning (03:44) of 17 January 2014, the fire was mapped at 11,318 hectares. Growth 
continued in a southerly direction, and the fire was 36,680 hectares at 18:26. A wind change resulted 
in the rear of the fire becoming the head, and it burned ~10,000 hectares in a ~14 km run to the north. 
On the morning (10:15) of the 18th, the fire was 49,153 hectares. Offensive suppression had not been 
possible unless the fire had reached pastureland. There was a further ~5500 hectares of fire growth 
due to burning operations that were used to contain the southern half of the fire. Major burning 
operations extended from the night of the 18 January 2014 to the morning of 20 January 2014 with 
hand-lighting along the existing roads. Natural in-fill burning from this anthropogenic origin 
occurred until the evening of the 22nd of January, when the area was burnt with aerial incendiaries. 
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Appendix A.10 Grampians
The first report of seven ignitions in the Grampians wildfire Complex (Figure A10) was at 09:04
on the 15th of January. Four ignitions were contained prior to being overrun by the rapidly growing
wildfire that resulted when multiple ignitions that were ~3 km apart joined on 16 January 2014. In the
late morning (10:25) of 16 January 2014, there were signs of column interactions between two fires,
one of which had grown to 100 hectares. By 14:08, the fires joined, and subsequently (17:37), assets in
a southerly direction (Smiths Road) were being impacted, and fire was ~1600 hectares. In the early
morning (03:44) of 17 January 2014, the fire was mapped at 11,318 hectares. Growth continued in a
southerly direction, and the fire was 36,680 hectares at 18:26. A wind change resulted in the rear of the
fire becoming the head, and it burned ~10,000 hectares in a ~14 km run to the north. On the morning
(10:15) of the 18th, the fire was 49,153 hectares. Offensive suppression had not been possible unless
the fire had reached pastureland. There was a further ~5500 hectares of fire growth due to burning
operations that were used to contain the southern half of the fire. Major burning operations extended
from the night of the 18 January 2014 to the morning of 20 January 2014 with hand-lighting along the
existing roads. Natural in-fill burning from this anthropogenic origin occurred until the evening of the
22nd of January, when the area was burnt with aerial incendiaries.
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Appendix B 
Table A1. A detailed description of the 20 suppression tasks that make up Figure 1. 
Task Description 
Slow running fire 
When containment or extinguishment is unlikely, aircraft drop water, foam, or chemical 
retardant on the head or flanks of a running wildfire to slow the forward rate of spread 
or decrease the head-fire width. 
Retard potential fire 
behaviour 
While control lines are being established aircraft drop water, foam, or chemical retardant 
on fuels that are burning inside, often at a distance of a km or more, of the proposed 
control lines of prevent fire behaviour from building into an organised flame front. Fuel 
at the drop locations is later burnt either naturally or during burning operations. 
Contain spot fires 
Aircraft drop water, foam, or chemical retardant on spot fires to prevent further spread 
and/or ground resources extinguish the spotfire, establishing control lines if necessary. 
Establish control 
lines 
Existing barriers (e.g., roads) provide access and a defensible, fuel free space from which 
the wildfire can be directly suppressed as it approaches or as a location from which 
burning operations can be initiated. Modification (e.g., brushing vegetation) may be 
necessary. 
Mineral earth control lines are constructed by plant/heavy equipment such as 
dozers/graders or ground crews either directly adjacent to the burning wildfire 
impeding spread or in a geographically favourable location from which burning 
operations can be initiated. 
The fire edge is fully extinguished (a wetline) and burnt fuel that will not re-burn forms 
the control line. 
Aircraft drop retardant to reinforce an alternate control line (no standalone retardant 
lines in case studies). 
Knock down flare 
ups 
Depending on accessibility, either ground crews or aircraft suppress a flare-up, or a 
small burst of increased fire behaviour in internal unburnt patches of fuel to prevent 
embers from causing spot fires.  
i . fi
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Table A1. A detailed description of the 20 suppression tasks that make up Figure 1.
Task Description
Slow running fire
When containment or extinguishment is unlikely, aircraft drop water, foam, or
chemical r tardant on the head or flanks o a running wildfi e to slow the fo ward
rat of spread or decrease the head-fire width.
Retard potential fire
behaviour
While control lines are being established aircraft drop water, foam, or chemical
retardant on fuels that are burning inside, often at a distance of a km or more, of
the pro osed control lines f prevent fire behavi ur from building into a
organised flame front. Fuel at the drop ocations s later burnt either naturally or
during burning operations.
Contain spot fires
Aircraft drop water, foam, or chemical retardant on spot fires to prevent further
spread and/or ground resources extinguish the spotfire, establishing control lines
i ne essary.
Establish control lines
Existing barriers (e.g., roads) provide access and a defensible, fuel free space from
which the wildfire can be directly suppressed as it approaches or as a location
from which bur ing operations can be initiated. Modification (e.g., brushing
vegetati n) may be necessary.
Mineral earth contr l lines are constr cted by plant/heavy equipme t such as
dozers/graders or ground crews either directly adjacent to the burning wildfire
impeding spread or in a geographically favourable location from which burning
operations can be initiated.
The fire edge is fully extinguished (a wetline) and burnt fuel that will not re-burn
forms the control line.
Aircraft drop retardant to reinforce an alternate control line (no standalone
retardant lines in case studies).
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Task Description
Knock down flare ups
Depending on accessibility, either ground crews or aircraft suppress a flare-up, or
a small burst of increased fire behaviour in internal unburnt patches of fuel to
prevent embers from causing spot fires.
Burn control lines
A fire is ignited progressively along a constructed or existing control line. The
anthropogenic fire either spreads to join the wildfire or the intervening unburnt
fuel is burnt in another operation.
Burn un-burnt patches
After the fuel along the control line has been burnt, either naturally or via
anthropogenic means, interior areas of unburnt fuel are ignited under favourable
burning conditions.
Aid repair to critical
infrastructure
Limited resources (e.g., 1–2 ground crews and/or dozer) assist Utilities Crews
with the process of repairing critical infrastructure.
Clean up Debris, burnt material, and downed trees are cleared for safety and access.
Rehabilitate control lines
Constructed control lines are returned to an environmentally sound state to
address erosion or access issues. Repairs to assets such as fences or lawns were
included on some wildfires.
Directly defend structures
Aircraft drop water, foam, or chemical retardant on the fuels that are burning near
structures or other assets.
Ground crews extinguish fuels that are near structures or embers that may ignite
structures. Some agencies train and equip firefighters for both wildland and




Crews are deployed to asset locations where wildfire impact is
anticipated—though no impact is occurring.




Determine where contingency lines could be established—limited to existing
features in defensive stage.
Construct contingency
control lines
Control lines are constructed, or existing features are improved in advance of
potential fire spread so as to provide a defensible space or permit future burning
operations should the wildfire spread beyond current containment control lines.
Suppress and mop-up
active fire
Suppress flaming and smouldering fuels near the wildfire edge or fire perimeter,
around assets and along public roadways.
ID and clear hazard trees Identify and clear hazard trees; hand falling and/or plant/heavy equipment used.
Full perimeter mop-up to
depth
Full extinguishment of all smouldering material for a full depth (typically 30 m or
greater) around the perimeter of the wildfire.
ID hotspots with IR
Infrared cameras (handheld or aerial) used to identify hotspots smouldering
within the fully extinguished perimeter, GPS locations of hotspots marked and
disseminated to ground crews to extinguish.
Mop-up limited hotspots Smouldering hotspots, limited in number, discovered while patrolling theperimeter or identified by IR technology are fully extinguished.
Look for flare-ups and
hotspots
Ground crews transit the fire perimeter to seek and supress overlooked hotspots
near the fire perimeter or internal flare-ups that throw embers beyond the control
lines and create spotfires.
Appendix C
Figure A12 shows the total number of ground-crew classified by stage on each day of the fire
for all 10 wildfires considered. Multiple colours in a single day indicate that various sectors reached
different stages. Ground crews are used as a proxy for total resource use.
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Figure A12. Total ground-crew classified by stage for each day of the fire (see Stonyford graph for axis labels and legend).
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